# BB1 IBE & IBKEM

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# Classification of IBE Schemes

Quadratic Residuosity (factoring-based)

[C'01]

"Full Domain Hash" (pairing-based)

[BF'01] → [GS'02] [YFDL'04]

"Exponent Inversion"

([MSK'02]) → [SK'03] [BB04,#2] , [G'06]

"Commutative Blinding"

[BB04,#1] → [BBG'05] [SW'05] [W'05] [N'05] [CS'05] ...

... by far, most flexible

# Bilinear Pairings

a.k.a. Bilinear Maps

- $G$ , $G_t$ – prime order $p$
- $e : G \times G \rightarrow G_t$
  - bilinear: $\forall a,b \in Z \quad \forall g \in G \quad e(g^a, g^b) = e(g, g)^{ab}$
  - non-degenerate: $g$ gen. $G \Rightarrow e(g, g)$ gen. $G_t$
  - efficiently computable
- general case $e : G \times G' \rightarrow G_t$

# Basic "BB-1"

## Setup

- params : $[\ g\ ,\ A=g^{a}\ ,\ B=g^{b}\ ,\ V=e(g,g')^{y}\ ]$
- master-key : $Y=(g')^{y}$

## Extract(Y ,id)

- $K_{id} = [\ K_1 = Y.(A^{id}.B)^{r}\ ,\ K_2 = g^{r}\ ]$

## Encrypt(id,M)

- $C = [\ C_0 = M.V^{s}\ ,\ C_1 = g^{s}\ ,\ C_2 = (A^{id}.B)^{s}\ ]$

## Decrypt($K_{id}$,C)

- $C_0 . e(C_2, K_2) / e(C_1, K_1) = M$

# Proposed "BB-1" IBE

Setup

- params : $[\ g\ ,\ A=g^{a}\ ,\ B=g^{b}\ ,\ V=e(g,g')^{y}\ ]$
- master-key : $a, b, y$

Extract(Y ,id)

- $K_{id} = [\ K_1 = (g')^{y+(a\,H(id)+b)r}\ ,\ K_2 = (g')^{r}\ ]$

Encrypt(id,M) $K = V^{s}$

- $C = [\ C_0 = M \text{ xor } H'(K)\ ,\ C_1 = g^{s}\ ,\ C_2 = (A^{H(id)}.B)^{s}\ ]$

$C_3 = s + H''(K,C_0,C_1,C_2)$

Decrypt($K_{id}$,C)

- $K = e(C_2, K_2) / e(C_1, K_1)$, $M = C_0 \text{ xor } H'(K)$ ,
  $s = C_3 - H''(K,C_0,C_1,C_2)$, test $K=V^{s}$ & $C1 = g^{s}$

# Proposed "BB-1" IBKEM

## Setup

- params : $[\ g\ ,\ A=g^{a}\ ,\ B=g^{b}\ ,\ V=e(g,g)^{y}\ ]$
- master-key : $a, b, y$

## Extract(Y ,id)

- $K_{id} = [\ K_1 = g^{y+(aH(id)+b)r}\ ,\ K_2 = g^{r}\ ]$

## Encrypt(id,M)

- $C = [\ C_1 = g^{s}\ ,\ C_2 = (A^{H(id)}.B)^{s}\ ]$ $\quad K = H'''(V^{s})$

## Decrypt($K_{id}$,C)

- $K = H'''(e(C_2, K_2) / e(C_1, K_1))$

# Security

Decision BDH in G [BF'03]

given $g,\ g^a,\ g^b,\ g^c \in G,\quad t \in G_t$

decide if $t = e(g,g)^{abc}$

IBE

fully secure : IND-ID-CCA2 in RO model

IBKEM

fully secure : ID and CCA2 for KEM in RO model